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CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES
TO CATHOLIC LAWYERS
THE HONORABLE HENRY J. HYDE*
By any relevant measure, the United States is the most in-
tensely religious country in the developed world.' Those who
travel abroad know from experience that Sunday is very differ-
ent in America than it is in Western Europe or Japan. Moreover,
evidence suggests that Americans have become even more relig-
ious over the past several generations. To be sure, there has
been a shift in the dynamics of American Christianity; the
churches of the old Protestant mainline are losing congregants
rapidly, while evangelical Protestantism and Roman Catholicism
continue to grow.'
* Chairman, House Judiciary Committee.
'See GEORGE H. GALLUP, JR., RELIGION IN AMERICA 1995, at 5-6 (1996) (finding
that "the United States is one of the most religious nations of the entire industrial-
ized world in terms of the level of attested religious beliefs and practices" and that
the second half of the twentieth century has been "the most churched half-century
in the nation's history"). Moreover, in a 1974 poll, 77% of those responding favored a
constitutional amendment to allow school prayer; in 1995, 71% favored it. See id. at
75.
2 A recent study by Andrew Greeley found that America not only retained its
religious vitality over the last century, but that the ranks of the faithful were in-
creasing. See Belief in Afterlife Found Greater in Gen-Xers Research: In Comparison
with Those Born Early in Century, Change Is Most Notable Among Catholics and
Jews, Study Finds, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1997, at B4. Significant gains resulted
from large numbers of Catholic and Jewish immigrants earlier in the century. See
id.; see also JOHN TRACY ELLIS, AMERICAN CATHOLICISM 122-23 (1956) (quoting sta-
tistics for the increasing numbers of Catholics from 1900 to 1956).
3 See Gregory C. Sisk, Questioning Dialogue by Judicial Decree: A Different
Theory of Constitutional Review and Moral Disclosure, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1691,
1747-48 (1994) (noting that many baby boomer parents are returning to church with
their children; not to the liberal mainline Protestant churches, which are declining
in membership, but rather to the evangelical churches). See generally Ira C. Lupu,
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The vitality of religious conviction and practice in the United
States is the single greatest source of our moral strength as a
democratic people.4 Indeed, religious conviction is the most pow-
erful buttress of democratic conviction in the United States. The
American people are democratic because the American people
are a religious people.
This point is too often passed over today, even by those sym-
pathetic to the utility of religion as a source of values. Ask your-
self: why is it that in this vibrantly, intensely, and diversely re-
ligious country, we enjoy such a high level of religious tolerance
and civic good-will among people of different faiths? Have the
American people made a grand, pragmatic bargain, choosing to
be tolerant because that is the easiest way to get along with
neighbors? Does religious tolerance in America rest on essen-
tially utilitarian foundations? Or, is it much more likely that the
American people are religiously tolerant because they believe
themselves religiously obliged to be religiously tolerant? As
Americans, we are tolerant of those who disagree with us about
the will of God because we believe it is God's will that we be tol-
erant of those who have a different view of God's will.
That is, religious tolerance in America rests on the firmest
possible foundation: religious conviction.5 Religious-tolerance-as-
pragmatic-bargain can quickly erode under the pressures of plu-
rality and difference. Religious tolerance that is religiously
grounded, however, is better able to withstand the pressures of
plurality, because it rests on the conviction that "difference" is
part of God's master plan for history, as Pope John Paul II sug-
gested at the United Nations in October of 1995.6 This means
To Control Faction and Protect Liberty: A General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 7
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 357 (1996).
' See Robert F. Kane & Fred M. Blum, The International Year of Bible Read-
ing-The Unconstitutional Use of the Political Process to Endorse Religion, 8 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 333, 343 (1991) (quoting President Ronald Reagan: "the Bible in-
spired many of the early settlers of our country, providing them with the strength,
character, convictions, and faith necessary to withstand great hardship and danger
in this new and rugged land ... which laid the foundation for the spirit of nationhood
that was to develop").
' See Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: Religious Freedom and Educa-
tional Opportunity Under Constitutional Federalism, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 113,
177-78 (1996) (praising Catholic schools because they convey values that are the
foundation of a democratic society: compassion, tolerance, and commitment to jus-
tice; such schools are open to non-Catholics, "the poor, the alienated, and the cul-
turally distinct").
6 See Pope John Paul II, Address Before the United Nations General Assembly,
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that religious people, instead of having to apologize for their
convictions, should celebrate those convictions as one of the well-
springs of democratic civility. Unfortunately, this celebratory
view of the place of religious conviction in public life is not uni-
versally shared.
Peter Berger, the distinguished sociologist of religion, once
said that on any index of religiosity and secularity, India is the
most intensely religious country on earth, and Sweden the most
secular! The trouble with America, Berger concluded, is that we
are a nation of Indians ruled by elite Swedes! Beyond Berger's
metaphor, the "Swedes" seem determined to wage war against
the "Indians." The vast majority of the "Indians" are content to
live in an America in which there is room in the public square for
the "Swedes"; the "Swedes" seem feverishly determined to drive
the "Indians," and the convictions the "Indians" most cherish,
from the arena of public life.9 It is not too difficult to locate the
cultural high ground from which the "Swedes" operate.'0 Think
of American higher education: many elite universities in the
United States were founded as religious schools." On most of
Oct. 5, 1995, reprinted in ORIGINS, Oct. 19, 1995, at 293.
' See generally PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY, ELEMENTS OF A
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF RELIGION (1967). "The global tendency seems to be in all
cases the emergence of a state emancipated from the sway of either religious insti-
tutions or religious rationales of political action." Id. at 130. In America the "state is
most benign to religion," parallel to its role in "laisser-faire capitalism." Id. at 131.
8 See id. at 130. This situation illustrates a severe blow to the traditional pur-
pose of religion, that is, to establish a common set of mores with universal meaning
for the members of a society. See id. at 134.
9 Berger refers to contemporary religious consciousness as being in an 'age of
skepticism, where religious tenets are pushed from "fundamental 'truths' on which
... all 'sane' men will agree," to a lesser level of "'subjective' views," where intelligent
people often disagree and "of which one is not altogether sure oneself." Berger, su-
pra note 7, at 150.
10 See Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Hostility to Religion, American Style, 42
DEPAUL L. REV. 263, 266 (1992) (commenting that the Supreme Court "has noted
that official governmental hostility to religion is not mandated by our Constitution"
and citing voluminous Court cases following this rationale); Edward McGlynn Gaff-
ney, Jr., Politics Without Brackets on Religious Convictions: Michael Perry and
Bruce Ackerman on Neutrality, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1143, 1147-51 (1990) (exposing
weaknesses in leading theories of liberal Bruce Ackerman, who advocates a rule
where religion would not play a significant role in the public sphere); Gustav Nie-
buhr, Land of Religious Freedom Has Universe of Spirituality, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
1997, at 4 (lamenting that because religious freedom is guaranteed, "belief in God
remains vastly popular" and the "Heaven's Gate" cult was able to exist and commit
mass suicide).
" See David L. Gregory, Where to Pray? A Survey Regarding Prayer Rooms in
A-B.A. Accredited, Religiously Affiliated Law Schools, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1287, 1304
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those campuses today, many of the faculty regard Jewish and
Christian orthodoxy as, at best, a whimsical tolerable "lifestyle
choice," of no more consequence than vegetarianism or parakeet-
keeping. 12 Indeed, the secularization of American higher educa-
tion over the past seventy-five years is one of the most astonish-
ing transformations in our national cultural history. What, for
example, do you think of when you think of Syracuse University
and the University of Southern California? You probably think
of basketball and broadcasting first, football and film-making
second. What you certainly do not think of is Methodism, de-
spite the fact that both of these schools were founded precisely as
Methodist institutions.13  More than a few observers see the
same process of secularization at work in our Catholic colleges
and universities today.
1 4
Similarly, the negative attitude toward religion, particularly
Christianity, is evidenced within the popular entertainment in-
dustry. There is no need here to rehearse the evidence of the
rampant "Christophobia" in Hollywood, a loathing of Christian-
ity that often is focused most intently on Catholic belief and
practice." But the Hollywood problem goes far beyond Catholi-
cism. Painful as it may be, think for a moment about the weekly
prime time sitcom fare on American network television. Can you
find, from Sunday night through Saturday night, a single depic-
n.68 (1993) (naming fifty-two institutions, including Harvard, Duke, Southern Cali-
fornia, and Syracuse, that originally had religious affiliations).
" See Helen C. White, What Place Has Religion In State University Education?,
in RELIGION AND THE STATE UNIVERSITY 89-90 (Erich A. Walter ed., 1958). White
observed that "in most intellectual circles theology is not regarded as the queen of
the sciences." Id. at 89. The average student, once "awed by the incomprehensible
words of the expert" professor, now casts aside the professor's claims of expertness.
Id. at 90. For an interesting contrast, see JERALD C. BRAUER, PROTESTANTISM IN
AMERICA 102-03 (1965) (describing debates between students and the president of
Yale College in 1759 over the validity of the Bible). In defending the Bible the presi-
dent had "little difficulty in demolishing every argument of the students ... [in a]
full, frank, and reasonable discussion ...."Id. at 102.
13 See GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN UNIvERSITY: FROM
PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT TO ESTABLISHED NONBELIEF 276 (1994); see also
Gregory, supra note 11, at 1310 n.68 (listing schools that in response to his survey
disclaimed any institutional religious affiliation, including Southern California and
Syracuse).
See generally MARSDEN, supra note 13.
See Yechiel Eckstein, Hollywood's Anti-Christian Bias, JEWISH PRESS, Feb.
14, 1997, at 4 (observing that where there is a Christian character in a film, he is
"usually depicted as a fool, a liar, cheater, a diabolical murderer or a crazy person"
and citing numerous examples, yet conceding that the Jewish faith is generally de-
picted in a favorable light).
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tion of a family doing what the majority of America's families do
every week, namely, go to church? The last network sitcom that
showed churchgoing as a normal part of the principal characters'
lives was the "Cosby Show," which vividly demonstrated that you
can be funny, successful, and unapologetically unsecular at the
same time.
At best, elite universities regard religious conviction as a
curious personal intellectual fetish. At worst, religious convic-
tion is a threat to the scholarly pursuit of truth. Hollywood
mocks religious conviction, or is simply complacent toward the
way in which most Americans conduct their lives. It is submit-
ted, however, that neither Harvard nor Hollywood pose the most
pressing danger to religious conviction and practice in the
United States today. That threat, I regret to report, comes from
the Supreme Court of the United States.
For over fifty years now, since Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion16 in 1947, the Supreme Court has bent and distorted the
First Amendment's religion clause until it is barely recognizable
today. Please note that I say religion "clause," rather than
"clauses." We are, of course, accustomed to the language of relig-
ion "clauses": a "Free Exercise Clause" and an "Establishment
Clause."17 But this false imagery of multiple religion "clauses"
points us, in fact, toward the root of the problem. As Professor
Mary Ann Glendon and Father Richard John Neuhaus have ar-
gued, in my view, persuasively, there is only one "religion clause"
in the First Amendment, 8 and its purpose is to foster the free
exercise of religion through, among other things, disestablish-
ment, the refusal to put the power of the state behind any one
creed or church. 9 In other words, free exercise is the end, and
"no establishment" is the means.
'6 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding a program to reimburse parents who spent
money transporting their children to both public and private schools, thereby view-
ing religious and secular schools neutrally).
17 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
'8 See Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 477, 478 n.8 (1991); see also Richard John Neuhaus, Polygamy, Peyote, and
the Public Peace, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 1990, at 63 (criticizing the 1990 Supreme Court
decision in Employment Division v. Smith as virtually nullifying the Religion
Clause).
19 See Glendon & Yanes, supra note 18, at 483-84 (stating that disestablishment
"is obviously not the purpose of the First Amendment) (quoting Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)).
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The goal is an America in which religious conviction flour-
ishes and religiously grounded moral argument enlivens a public
discourse carried on within the bounds of democratic civility.
The goal is most certainly not the naked public square. Nor is
the goal to officially sanction secularism as the national ideology.
Over the past fifty years, the Supreme Court has first di-
vided the First Amendment's religion clause into two separate
religion clauses, 2° and, second, attempted to balance the two
"clauses."2' Ultimately, the Court subordinated "free exercise" to
"no establishment," so that "no establishment" became the over-
arching goal and "free exercise" became something merely to be
accommodated, if possible.22 Or, as the 1978 edition of Professor
Laurence Tribe's constitutional law textbook put it, with admi-
rable directness, there is a zone that the Free Exercise Clause
carves out of the Establishment Clause for permissible accom-
modations of religious interests.2 This zone might be character-
ized as the "zone of permissible accommodation."2
I disagree with Professor Tribe. Religious conviction is not
an "interest" to be understood by analogy to the used car dealers'
lobby, and people of faith are not here to be "accommodated."
Indeed, I can imagine nothing more likely to erode the loyalties
of American citizens to their country and its democratic experi-
ment than the notion that the deepest convictions of the over-
20 Glendon and Yanes argue that the separate incorporation dates of the First
Amendment religious freedom language in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940) (guaranteeing a qualified right to free exercise of religion) and Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (interpreting the Establishment Clause pro-
vision to require the strict separation of church and state), "created an appearance
of conflict between two provisions that history and text suggest were meant to work
together in the service of religious liberty." Glendon & Yanes, supra note 18, at 482.
21 Compare Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (disapproving of expressions of
religious conviction at a public school graduation ceremony), with Abington Sch.
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (stating that
the First Amendment requires neutrality, not hostility, toward religion; "[tihe basic
purpose of the religion clause of the First Amendment is to promote and assure the
fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for all and to nurture the
conditions which secure the best hope of attainment of that end"). See generally
ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY (1990).
22 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding that an Alabama mo-
ment-of-silence statute, while allowing free exercise, was unconstitutional because it
violated the establishment clause).
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-4, at 822-23 (1st
ed. 1978).
24 Id. at 823.
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whelming majority of our people are something that can only be
"accommodated." Yet that is precisely what the Supreme Court
has done over the past two generations.
Moreover, the Court has not been content with distorting,
and then inverting the First Amendment's provision for a robust
national religious life. The Court has also taken to instructing
the American people on the dangers of religious conviction. Jus-
tice Anthony Kennedy, in Lee v. Weisman, claimed that public
expression of religious conviction is inherently divisive, coercive,
and irrational.25  Justice David Souter, concurring, suggested
that religious conviction lacks substantive importance. 6 Not to
be outdone, Justice Henry Blackmun argued in his concurrence
that religious conviction generated violent tendencies.27 We
might also note, in this unhappy trajectory, the charge raised by
Justice David Souter during oral argument in the 1995 case Ro-
senberger v. University of Virginia,' that a student fee-funded
Christian publication had been "proselytizing," to which counsel
for the students, Professor Michael McConnell of the University
of Chicago Law School replied, "[Proselytize ... is nothing but an
ugly word for persuade, which is just exactly what the Free
Speech Clause is designed to protect."9
The Court's warped First Amendment jurisprudence has not
only damaged the law, but has also had a chilling effect on the
American public square, where too many public employees and
bureaucrats now assume that they have a mandate to promote
secularism and to deny any "space" for Christian religious con-
viction. Public school teachers will accept papers on witches, but
forbid students to write reports on Jesus."0 A school board is
forced to determine the constitutionally permissible balance be-
tween Bach and Irving Berlin in a public school choir's
26 Lee, 505 U.S. at 588.
26 See id. at 629-30 (Souter, J., concurring).
7 "Of all the issues the ACLU takes on ... by far the most volatile issue is that
of school prayer. Aside from our efforts to abolish the death penalty, it is the only
issue that elicits death threats." Id. at 607 n.10 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting
Michele A. Parish, Graduation Prayer Violates the Bill of Rights, 4 UTAH BAR J. 19,
19 (June/July 1991)).
28 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
Transcript of Oral Arguments at *53, Rosenberger v. University of Va., 515
U.S. 819 (1995) (No. 94-329), available in 1995 WL 117631.
'o See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987) (noting that the Court has
routinely overruled statutes which provide for religion being taught in primary and
secondary schools).
38 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 2
"Christmas concert."31 Pardon me, it is now the "Winter Holiday
Concert."
Religious non-profit schools and charitable institutions are
also affected when public welfare funds flow through their
books. 2 Should an American diocese that operates a homeless
shelter known as the "St. Vincent de Paul Shelter" be pressured
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, which
provided the diocese with modest funds for blankets and cots, to
change the name of the shelter to "Mr. Vincent de Paul Shel-
ter?
33
This cultural and constitutional madness is eroding the
foundation of American democracy, which is why I have intro-
duced H.R.J. Resolution 121.3 H.R.J. Resolution 121 is a consti-
tutional amendment aimed at repairing the damage that has
been done by the Supreme Court beginning with Everson."' This
amendment is, I believe, a contemporary expression of the great
constitutional tradition of American democracy. It is also con-
gruent with the teaching of the Second Vatican Council on the
"first right," which is religious freedom.36  Like the American
Founders and Framers, the Fathers of Vatican II, and Pope John
Paul II, who himself has done so much to develop the Council's
teaching on religious freedom, I believe that the state, as an in-
stitution, is, by its nature, theologically incompetent. That is
why I do not want to see the State in the business of orchestrat-
ing or composing liturgies.
But, by the same token, I do not want the State to forbid
people to bring their most cherished convictions into our public
life. Thus, my proposed amendment, which reads, "Neither the
"1 See Florey v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist., 619 F.2d 1311, 1316 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980). A
rule provided by the School Board of Sioux Falls states, "[miusic ... having religious
themes or basis are permitted as part of the curriculum for school-sponsored activi-
ties and programs if presented in a prudent and objective manner and as a tradi-
tional part of the cultural and religious heritage of the particular holiday." Id. at
1319.
32 See Johnson v. Sanders, 319 F. Supp. 421, 430-31 (D. Conn. 1970) (stating
that when public assistance is given to parochial schools, the money must be used
for a non-religious purpose, so as not to offend the Establishment Clause).
'" See Mark E. Chopko, Don't Exclude the Churches, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 29, 1988, at
14.
14 H.R.J. Res. 121, 104th Cong. (1995).
'5 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
'6 See Second Vatican Council, DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, Declaration on Religious
Liberty (Dec. 7, 1965).
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United States nor any State shall deny benefits to or otherwise
discriminate against any private person or group on account of
religious expression, belief, or identity; nor shall the prohibition
on laws respecting an establishment of religion be construed to
require such discrimination,"" makes clear that the Constitution
does not discriminate against religious speech or practice. There
should be, if you will, a level playing field in the American public
square. All convictions deserve a voice and should be included
within the "bond of democratic civility."
In addition to the pervasive secular domination of American
government, another more specific challenge facing today's
Catholic lawyer is the issue of abortion. Those of us who have
been contesting the abortion license granted by the Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade38 sometimes wonder whether there is any-
thing new to be said on the subject. Recently, however, thanks
to decisions by the Ninth and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals,39
we may begin to see just where the Roe abortion license, consti-
tutionally redefined in Planned Parenthood v. Casey is leading
us as a nation.
In 1992, in the plurality opinion in Casey, Justices Anthony
Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor, and David Souter attempted to
put the abortion license on a firmer constitutional footing by
abandoning the "right to privacy" ground cited in Roe, 1 and in its
place locating the "right to abortion" in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's "liberty" provision.42 Moreover, the justices, as is too fre-
quently their wont, began to dabble in metaphysics, arguing that
"the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of hu-
'7 H.R.J. Res. 121, at 2.
38 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
" See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716
(2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
40 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
4" See id. at 852-53 (recognizing the applicability of the reasoning of Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) to the
abortion issue).
" See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. "Constitutional protection of the woman's decision
to terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It declares that no State shall 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.' The controlling word ... before us is 'liberty.'"
Id.
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man life." 3
Astute commentators at the time noted that this was a per-
nicious, even lethal, doctrine that drained the word "freedom" of
its moral content and discarded any authority inherent in moral
traditions and moral communities like the family. In addition,
lifting up the imperial autonomous self as the be-all and end-all
in American democracy reduced the legally relevant actors in our
society to only the individual and the state. Those with some
sense of the history of the twentieth century, especially twenti-
eth century totalitarianism, have some idea where this stripped
down image of society could lead over time.
In 1994, Chief Judge Rothstein of the U.S. District Court in
Seattle applied the Casey definition of "liberty" in striking down
a century-old law in Washington State that forbade physician-
assisted suicide." In March 1996, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld Judge Rothstein's decision and concluded that
the "liberty" provision of the Fourteenth Amendment included a
constitutional due process "right" to physician-assisted suicide.45
Less than a month later, in April 1996, the Second Circuit struck
down a New York State law banning physician-assisted suicide,
citing the Fourteenth Amendment "equal protection" grounds for
its holding.4" Subsequently, the Supreme Court reversed both
Courts of Appeals' decisions, finding in Washington v. Glucks-
berg that the professed "right" to physician-assisted suicide was
expressly "not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause."47 Unfortunately, the Glucksberg decision is
not sufficient to repair the substantial damage that has been
done by the abortion decisions; therefore, the amendment I pro-
pose is still urgently needed.
What is at stake is nothing less than the meaning of human
freedom. The Supreme Court has reduced "freedom" to mere in-
4' Id. at 851.
"See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1466 (W.D.
Wash. 1994), affd, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
"6 On further appeal, a panel reversed Judge Rothstein. 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.
1995). On en banc reconsideration, an eleven member petit panel reversed and wrote
broadly about a due process "right to die." 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd, Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).46 See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
47 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2271.
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strumental categories.4 Freedom has become understood, quite
simply and starkly, as the rules-of-the-game by which imperial
autonomous selves, devoid of connections to moral traditions or
moral communities, adjudicate their private wills with no relig-
ious conviction. James Madison's richly textured concept of
freedom and its relationship to moral communities has dropped
from the Constitution, to be replaced by Friedrich Nietzsche's
nihilism.49 This is not the freedom in whose cause the Founders
pledged their lives, fortunes, and sacred honor. And this most
certainly is not the freedom for which, as St. Paul told the Gala-
tians, "Christ ... set us free.""
There is hope, but it will take persuasion and perseverance.
Congress and the state legislatures have the power to erect bar-
riers against the outrageous implications and consequences of
the Court's nihilistic concept of freedom. We may even be able to
repair some of the damage that has been done to the Constitu-
tion through an amendment that makes plain that there is no
constitutionally guaranteed right to abortion or physician-
assisted suicide. But, tragically, we cannot so easily repair the
damage done to the moral foundations of our democracy, unless
and until people of faith help this country to regain the moral
substance essential to the freedom that we cherish.
In an address to the United Nations in October 1995, the
Holy Father, Pope John Paul II, said that the "quest for freedom
... is one of the great dynamics of human history."" But, as he
See e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. 577; Edwards, 482 U.S. 578; Everson, 330 U.S. 1; Roe,
410 U.S. 113; Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293; Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258.
49 See RANDALL HAVAS, NIETZSCHE'S GENEALOGY: NIHILISM AND THE WILL TO
KNOWLEDGE xiii (1995).
From Nietzsche's point of view ... [perfect] indifference amounts to a form
of nihilism ....
Nietzschean nihilism is usually thought of as a transitional stage between
two different ways of evaluating human life, between two different 'tables
of values.' ... [Wihile we once measured our lives by a divine standard, and
found them wanting, we have ... come to distrust this standard - to find it
unbelievable.... In the future, however, some of us may come to love our
lives even in the absence of an external standard by which to measure
their value. Those of us who fail to do so will have to learn to live with the
thought that not only does human life lack the value that we once hoped it
had, but it lacks any other value as well.
Id.
See Galatians 5:1.
"Address by Pope John Paul II to the United Nations General Assembly (Oct.
5, 1995), reprinted in ORIGINS, Oct. 19, 1995, at 293, 295.
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went on to remind us at his Mass in Baltimore several days
later, "freedom" is not the power to do what we like, but rather
"the right to do what we ought."52 Freedom is a moral ideal, not
merely a legal and political one, and reduced to a mere instru-
ment, freedom destroys itself. For human beings and societies to
flourish, freedom must be tethered to the moral truth about hu-
mankind. In the end, freedom will only be truly accomplished
through goodness.
That is the great task I put before you, as Catholic lawyers
and public advocates: be witnesses to the true meaning of free-
dom; refuse to acquiesce in a national descent into nihilism; help
restore moral content to the freedom that is America's hallmark;
and, as a result, give this great Republic a new birth of freedom.
5" Homily by Pope John Paul II, in Oriole Park, Baltimore, MD (Oct. 8, 1995),
reprinted in ORIGINS, Oct. 19, 1995, at 312, 314 (emphasis added).
